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Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies
The record of the post-conflict institutional (re-) design in Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina today is mixed at best. While peace is now the norm in former Yugoslavia, the countries and regions which emerged are marred by weak institutions which are often unable to undertaken the reforms necessary to bring the region closer to the European Union. Furthermore, ethnicity continues to be the primary political identity in most former conflict regions. Especially in the more diverse parts of former Yugoslavia, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia, ethnic affiliation often matters more than economic or social platforms. More troubling than the prevalence of ethnic identity is the conflictual relationship between the different identities, which often appears to preclude constructive engagement and overcome the politics of the zero-sum-game.
One of the features of the post-conflict agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia is the institutionalization of ethnicity. This expression denotes the representation of ethnic groups as ethnic groups in state institutions, including legislature, executive, judiciary and public administration. This representation might be cascading to lower levels of governance, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or might be limited to the state level, as in Macedonia. Alternatively, a term frequently used to describe the system of governance in the three cases is 'power-sharing'. While Bosnia-Herzegovina, its entities, Kosovo and Macedonia possess features of powersharing systems, all three lack crucial features. Generally speaking, the majority of power-sharing systems follow the consociational approach proposed by Arend Lijphart, which primarily identifies four mechanisms (grand coalition, minority vetoes, proportional representation, segmental autonomy). A smaller number takes the integrative approach 2 of Donald Horowitz as foundation for power sharing, which 2 This approach can be best described as a strategy, as it is less focused on particular institutional arrangement, as consociationalims, but rather at integrative policies. Unlike consociationalism, it is also primarily concerned with conflict-reduction.
focuses on incentives for cross-ethnic cooperation (Sisk 1996: 34-45 This cursory glance suggests that all three cases display key elements of consociational arrangements, but differ in a number of aspects from conventional understanding of power-sharing. This is not to argue that the analytical lens of powersharing is not useful in understanding governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia or Kosovo. 5 Institutionalized ethnicity is conceptually broader and allows for the inclusion of cases where power-sharing takes place only to some degree. Furthermore, it places the emphasis on institutional representation of ethnicity, where governments exercise only limited powers-be it due to weak states or strong international intervention-and little of it is shared, but mostly divided.
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Similarly some of the cantons have been loosing the exclusivity to one group due to the constitutional changes and refugee returns. This term (together with complex consociation) has been introduce by Brendan O'Leary to denote consociational arrangements which include additional features (self-determination dispute-resolution, peace agreement, external intervention and other distinct ethnic governance strategies such as integration, territorial autonomy or arbitration) to Ljipharts' four basic aspects (O'Leary 2004). 5 Indeed, the following discussion will refer to definitions and experiences in power-sharing beyond the region.
The Legacy and Features of Institutionalized Ethnicity a) Historical Legacies
Today, ethnic belonging matters when applying for civil service, running for parliament or joining government in Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Both public perception and the legal framework elevate national identity to one of the primary, if not the only, criteria in political life.
The origins of institutionalizing the primacy of national identity has two main sources:
1. The pre-war Yugoslav legacy 2. The conflict and war While often neglected, the late Yugoslav system contained elaborate mechanisms for minority protection and ethnic representation (Pupavac 2000: 3-8) . A key difference, however, was the governance by a unified political elite, rather than by antagonistic ethnically fragmented elites (Andjelić 2003: 39-40) . As such, the Yugoslav system and its permutation in Bosnia-Herzegovina were thus not consociational arrangements based on elite compromise, but rather systems of control, where Communist officials of the different nations were primarily charged with monopolizing the only legitimate expression of national identity and opposing real and supposed nationalism within the own community. 6 In Macedonia and Kosovo, guaranteed group representation had not been a prominent feature of the Communist system, as they where not defined in the same multinational terms as Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, dominance by one nation has been a strong feature of institutional representation during socialism in Macedonia and Kosovo. As such, the institutionalization of ethnicity might appear to be a 'hangover' from Communist Yugoslavia (USIP 2000: 6) , but fulfill different functions in post-conflict Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia
The second source of institutionalized ethnicity has been the conflicts themselves and attempts at resolving them. Both the demands voiced by parties during the conflict, in particular in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina gave rise to increased group-based representation. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the demands focused largely on the territorialization of ethnicity, which is why the structure of power-sharing institutions 6 As Brendan O'Leary points out, there are also authoritarian consociations. Whether this category applies to Communist-era Bosnia-Herzegovina is doubtful, as it the republic was governed essentially by the same elite who 'happened' to belong to different ethnic groups.
received considerably less attention than the drawing of boundaries and the delegation of power to lower levels and more homogenous levels of governance. In the case of Kosovo, the focus of the conflict was also on territory, with the main actor Serbia not formally partaking in the institutional set-up of the region. As a result, the post-war institutionalization of ethnicity focused less on group inclusion as on the creation of institutional legitimacy. In Macedonia, although a territorialized conflict, the main demands were over inclusion at the state level, reflected in the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Thus both the demands of the parties to the conflict and a clearly identifiable learning curve of international organizations involved in the brokering of peace agreements impacted the post-conflict institutional arrangements. While in Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnicity has been largely territorialized (Bieber 2002: 236-7) , the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia rejects territorial solutions and seeks to maintain some of the civic features of the state (Daftary 2001: 304-305 (Malazogu, Dugolli 2003: 15-17) . While generally set-aside seats have been less controversial than other aspects of institutionalized ethnicity, the mechanisms used to ensure representation of all main groups are often rather crude and emphasize ethnic belonging over alternative approaches to ensure the representation of all main groups (Harris, Reilly 1998 : 2000 .
All three cases have some type of veto mechanism that ensures that non-dominant groups cannot be outvoted. In Macedonia, this mechanism is limited to particular key areas, such as major changes to the nature of the state (constitution, territorial organization) and issues which affect non-dominant groups (education Veto rights are possibly the most controversial mechanism of institutionalized ethnicity, as it has the largest impact on decision-making processes and is-especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina-widely viewed as being responsible for the ungovernability of the region. At the same time, some veto rights are necessary in deeply divided societies to prevent permanent outvoting of one or several groups. Specific veto rights, as in Macedonia, and constructive mediation processes after a veto has been invoked is one of the directions in which the negative effects of vetoes can be minimized, as will be discussed later on.
If the representation of all groups at the governmental and parliamentary level do not translate into equitable representation in the public administration, as was the case in 
Alternatives and Challenges to the Status Quo
The Criticism of existing arrangements and proposed alternatives can be distinguished on three levels: conceptual, procedural, and institutional. have largely been reactions to the dominance of an ethnicity-centered discourse, which reduced both the causes to conflict and the post-conflict reality to ethnic identity. While ethnicity is certainly neither a wholly independent variable, which invariably appears by itself and ceases to exist autonomously, in conflicts nor in the post-war periods, nevertheless ethnic belonging has mattered and continues to matter.
While ethnopolitical mobilization has to be also met with strategies addressing other dimensions of development, identity has to be taken seriously.
The procedural criticism of the status quo in post-conflict settings focuses particularly on the role of the international community in post-war reconstruction. While the security function and the contribution to the physical reconstruction of the region has come under less substantial criticism, the civilian role has been the key focus. In the domestic discourse of the region we can detect the view that the international intervention has been legitimizing ethnic divisions and cooperating too willingly with nationalist parties. This view, largely advocated by liberal intellectuals, supports a stronger role in 'engineering' society to allow for the development of a civic-oriented political system. From the other side, nationalist forces have criticized international intervention for favoring allegedly moderate forces and extending their intervention beyond the original ambitions. The domestic debates are largely mirrored, although argued differently, in international policy debates. Some observers have criticized the extensive international intervention on a number of grounds. While some have argued that the intervention is essentially undemocratic (Chandler 1999) , others have suggested that the undemocratic nature is less problematic than the long-term effect in undermining democratization of the region and creating dependencies (Knaus, Martin 2003: 60-74) . The policy debate is shaped by the alternative view, which calls for more forceful intervention and stronger pressure on the nationalist forces (ICG 2001) . 10 Here, the argument is based a) on the injustice of both post-war arrangements and the legitimacy it bestows on some unsavory local parties and b) on the observation of the undemocratic practices of these actors.
b) The Institutional Alternatives
The final-and probably the most neglected-dimension of the debate is focused on the design of the post-war institutional systems. As the post-war agreements helped to end the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia, they are largely presented as unchangeable and taboo by international actors. The words 'Dayton' or 'Ohrid' have become talismans for political reform often extending beyond the substance of the original agreements. The reluctance to reconsider the peace agreements appears at first justifiable in the light of the alternatives suggested by political actors in the region. In Bosnia-Herzegovina most alternatives actually advocated the strengthening of one groups' ethno-territorial autonomy or dominance, such as the establishment of a Croat entity, the 'cantonization' of the entire country, or the abolition of the entities.
In Macedonia, similarly, the main alternative has been the proposed ethnic partition of the country (Georgievski 2003) .
Although mostly rejected by Western policy makers and observers, some observers have repeatedly suggested partitioning as a solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia (Mearsheimer, Van Evera 1999; Friedman 2001 The International Crisis Group has somewhat modified its position more recently, describing the nationalist parties as "a natural and legitimate phenomenon in BiH", while recommending to the International Community "that there is no need to fear pushing them to the limit, especially by attacking their illicit sources of financial power and powers of patronage" (ICG 2003: iii) .
such, it does not only dismiss all international efforts in the region during the past decade, but also neglects both the global experience of co-existence and the regional experience (Bose 2003; Liotta, Jebb 2002: 96-111) . Many arguments associated with the partitionist approach are firmly grounded in the nationalist mindset of parts of the regional intellectual and political elite, which is not only responsible for the conflicts which gave rise to the partitionist argument, but which is also based on a The arguments and their function in the mobilization for ethnic conflict are discussed in detail in : Petersen 2002; Kaufman 2001; Horowitz 1985: 141-181. 12 This view can be heard in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia, while in Kosovo the severity of the divisions has made such a position more rare.
appears not only unrealistic, but potentially dangerous. The concept of an ethnically neutral state appears attractive where ethnicity has not only dominated political life for more than a decade, but also where it has been a justification for crimes and corruption. Currently, politics in Macedonia, Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina are anything but ethnically blind and abolishing power-sharing mechanism and other instruments of group representation will not necessarily benefit citizens who seek to move away from a political discourse dominated by ethnicity. This is case for two key reasons:
First, the 'injustice of procedural democracy' (Simon 2001: 11-28) Here I mean not necessarily the salience of this identity, which can change rather rapidly, but the relationship between group identities, e.g. while it might be possible for individual Serbs to become Bosniacs, such a change en masse is highly unlikely.
14 The constitution contained some discriminatory articles, such as introducing Serbian written with Cyrillic alphabet as the official language (Constitution of the Serb Republic 1992: Art. 7).
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One of the few exception is Apartheid South Africa. The seeming contradiction between recognizing the immediate need for group-based political arrangements and the long-term hope for a less ethnicity-based political system is widely supported, yet vague in detail. How can institutional systems evolve from rigidly enforcing group-based identity to other lines of political confrontation?
As suggested earlier, this cannot occur successfully through a radical break or 'rebooting' a system of government, 17 but rather through gradual change. Firstly, this might run counter to the interests of established elites and thus be unfeasible. Secondly, the systemic difference between a consociational democracy and an individual liberal democracy are so substantial that such a commitment to change is inherently problematic. In fact, it might undermine the legitimacy of the current system and create instability rather than a transition to a more stabile system.
The success of a number of democratic systems recognizing and institutionalizing differences (Smooha 2002: 423-431) suggests that the goal need not be a liberal democracy, but a political system which weighs individual and group representation differently than current arrangements and eliminates some of the systemic problems of the current post-conflict institutions rather than striving for an ideal type with limited chances for success.
The subsequent two chapters seek to outline such policy approaches, which can facilitate such a development. The first set of considerations addresses processes of changes in which help reconceptualize the existing institutional arrangements as processes rather than being final. In the second part, policies are discussed which address the institutional set-up itself and introduce a higher degree of flexibility.
Mechanisms for Change a) Facing Change
Institutional development and interethnic accommodation is widely viewed by domestic and international actors in South-eastern Europe as being a process with a clear and well-defined end. It is, however, flawed to conceptualize the institutional accommodation of ethnic groups as ever being finite or conclusive.
First, this assumption is based on a conceptual flaw. Enshrining institutions does not adequately reflect the nature of interethnic relations, which are changing over time between groups and within groups. The polarization of ethnicity can vary over time and has to be taken account of. Institutions and interethnic arrangements have to continue to reflect the nature of society. The case of Lebanon, as already mentioned above, can for example illustrate this. Institutions set up in the 1940s no longer reflected reality by the 1970s through urbanization, altered distribution of groups and shifts in the social and political influence of groups. The fixed quotas, based on a preindependence census, eventually failed to reflect the population distribution and thus contributed to the failure of the power-sharing system. This provided one of the triggers for the conflict, which ensued for 14 years (Lijphart 1977: 149-150) .
Second, rigid institutional structures run the risk of 'over-institutionalizing' ethnicity, as they tend to be concluded at the high point of interethnic conflict. As such they frequently enshrine political representation and participation on the basis of group membership, which can 'freeze' ethnic confrontation and transpose most political disputes into ethnic ones.
Third, projecting the image of final institutional and constitutional arrangements renders negotiations more difficult, due to their finality. Additionally, any postagreement demands are perceived as a threat to interethnic accommodation rather than being incorporated into an ongoing process of monitoring and review.
The conclusion should not be the permanent redrafting of the countries' constitutions or the other institutional foundations of interethnic accommodation. Furthermore onesided public proclamations over the complete revision of existing agreements can create anxiety among other groups and should thus be discouraged. However, there should be means for regular domestic cross-ethnic review of the existing arrangements, which can allow for their fine-tuning and development. As a finality of any arrangement cannot exist, it should not be offered or demand by international actors. Instead, the parameters of change should be defined, i.e. the process in which change can take place (institutional vs. extra-institutional); and the rules of such changes (consensual vs. conflictual).
Recommendation
• Domestic mechanisms for review and monitoring should be established. Expert bodies composed of all relevant groups, parties and experts, leading to possible recommendation on adjusting existing institutional mechanisms, should conduct a regular review of institutions and their performance.
b) Local Ownership of the Negotiation Process
All key instruments to include minorities and ethnic groups in the political process in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have been negotiated and frequently drafted by international actors. While this role of international actors was necessary in the immediate post-conflict setting, a long-term stabilization will require local parties to take ownership over the institutional arrangements (Solioz, Dizdarević 2003) .
Despite being the result of negotiations, many peace-agreements are seen as an 'imposition' or 'alien'. This perception can constitute a serious drawback in the emergence of political constituencies supporting interethnic accommodation and the accompanying institutional arrangements (Bieber 2003a: 12) .
In addition, as detailed earlier, there is a need for institutional adjustments irrespective of this consideration in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will be in Macedonia and Kosovo.
Such adjustments should not be imposed, but be the result of a local process. To create and sustain viable polities in the three cases, they have to rest on the consensus of the key political actors and the communities they represent. The reliance on domestic institutional means can help provide security to the communities, in particular groups, which might be reserved towards international intervention. Unlike external imposition, even if conducted with best intentions, domestic processes follow a clear procedure and require a consensus among the key political actors. This can reduce fears of being out-voted or having new disadvantageous mechanisms imposed.
In such a process, there will be a strong role of international actors as both support during negotiations and in providing incentives for cooperation and possibly punishing obstruction.
Recommendations
• There should be no 'Dayton-2' or other repetition of internationally -enforced institutional reforms.
• International organizations in the region should focus on building negotiation capacity with the community elites and guide the process of local constitutional debate be directed towards ending their own role in the region.
c) Building Popular Support
Public support for both peace agreements and major constitutional changes is crucial in securing their acceptance and subsequent implementation. In the past, often insufficient attention has been paid to build a constituency among those most affected by these agreements-the citizens of the country or region. The diplomatic setting in which the various peace agreements have been negotiated often stood in the way of recognizing the importance of support among the population (Daftary 2001: 307) .
Parties to constitutional and institutional reforms often consider interethnic agreements as zero-sum games that are best obscured rather than explained to their respective constituency. As a result attempts to build public support for institutional reform have been only sporadic. This approach can clearly not be sufficient in the long term. First, it opens to the door to spoilers who can capitalize on the weak popular support for interethnic compromise. Second, it often stands in the way of full implementation, as political elites are uncertain about popular support for the compromises contained in any such reform package.
At times negotiators have expressed their reservations about the use of referenda to secure public support for peace agreements, as there has been a manipulation of referenda to revoke support for peace plans in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Serbian side during the conflict. In the aftermath of the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement as well, some Macedonian parties critical or opposed to the accords sought to launch a referendum on the accords. This idea, advocated briefly by the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, was abandoned as a result of international pressure (Jovanovski, Dulovi 2002: 67) . Furthermore, conditions are often not permissive for the holding of a free and fair referendum. Finally, a question remains over the support necessary for a referendum to be considered a success by each community. While in a referendum each community does is not required to support separately, a positive result that rests on the support of only some parties to the conflict might be insufficient and even damage any accord. were subjected to popular vote.
Peace agreements, not unlike other internationally negotiated treaties tend to be complex and not easily accessible, making it often difficult to 'sell' to the electorate.
The experience with the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union in 1992 should be a warning here. The distribution of the Treat text to every household was been identified as one of the causes for the rejection of the treaty, as its complex language and structure alienate many voters rather than convince it of its benefits.
On the other hand, a referendum can help build crucial support for agreements ending ethnic conflict. The referendum on the Good Friday in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in 1998 can so far seen as a positive example.
If a referendum is likely to gather the majority support from all major communities, then it can be the most powerful tool to oblige political elites to move along the with the reforms and constrains the role of spoilers. 
Recommendations
• All major changes in the institutional arrangement have to be communicated to the population and support for it built. International organizations and the donor community should provide support and, if necessary, initiate such activities.
• If strong support from all major communities is reasonably secure, agreements and constitutional reforms can be legitimized through referenda.
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In Northern Ireland, the referendum did not prevent the rise of spoilers, partly the result of the subsequent peace process itself and partly the result of the divided Unionist camp during the referendum. There are three key concerns of such rigid systems in government and parliament.
Institutional Reforms
First, the more elaborate the system in terms of quotas, the more likely the mechanisms is to fail and immobilize the entire political system In the Federation for example, the House of People could not be constitute for months after the 2002 elections, as the seats reserved for Serbs could not be filled according to regular constitutional procedure. While such blockages can be overcome within the framework of an international (semi-) protectorate, they can seriously diminish governance in a fully autonomous country and lead to a deterioration, not an improvement of interethnic relations.
Second, rigid systems often promote tokenism, where smaller group members in parliament or government do not represent a sizable constituency within the respective community. In extreme cases, such systems can promote abuse by "switching" of national identity for the benefit of attaining particular reserved offices.
Thirdly, the allocation of offices on the basis of ethnicity assigns legitimacy to grouprather than interest-based representation in the particular institution. Such a system raises considerable concern in parliaments and government, but is even more problematic in regard to the judiciary, where for example in both entities of BosniaHerzegovina leading offices are part of the entity-wide 'ethnic key' which limit the offices which can be held by one community.
Altogether, the numerical lock on group representation should be only the last resort, preferably temporary. Only in bodies, which are meant to represent group interest, such tools can be permanent.
Recommendations
§ Representativeness in the judiciary should be accomplished independently of ethnic quota for other high offices from other branches (executive and legislature), but rather through general requirements of equitable representation. § Governmental inclusion of groups should be set with minimum and flexible shares rather than strict quotas. § Reserved seats in parliament are only useful for smaller minorities, which might be excluded from representation. Otherwise electoral system and electoral unit boundaries should secure equitable inclusion of all mayor groups. This requires the creation of electoral commissions, which include all groups and allow for protective mechanisms to prevent gerrymandering.
b) Avoiding Destructive Veto Rights
Veto rights to communities constitute an integral part of power-sharing arrangements in general and are incorporated in the institutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, In recent arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, representation has been seen as a panacea for group inclusion. However, power sharing, including veto rights, and other forms of political representation cannot replace firm protections of group members from discrimination and other group based rights in fields of culture and education.
Political representation without minority or group rights can reduce the protection of individuals and group to interethnic bargaining-often to the detriment of individuals.
These rights should be firmly set and include mandatory obligations of the state or the relevant authority, such as clear numerical thresholds for creating minority language classes.
If rights and anti-discrimination mechanisms are not adequately legally defined, there is greater room for nationalist parties to warn of the supposed or real threat to their nation within the existing political arrangement. Such claims should be discredited as far as possible through legal protection, as political participation cannot provide such a sense of security (Bieber 2003b: 37-44) Legal mechanisms have to be combined with effective remedies to individuals in the case of breaches and substantial international supervision and monitoring of the authorities performance.
Recommendations
• Strengthening minority rights and anti-discrimination legislation in BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia.
• Setting up a regional monitoring of group rights violations by international organizations in cooperation with NGOs. Including firm standards of minority rights protection (and monitoring) in the SAP process.
d) Bringing in the Local Level
Central level institutions are unable to significantly advance interethnic relations without matching processes of cooperation at the local level. As experience in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina exemplifies this fact. Refugees of locally non-dominant groups usually return upon a change in the local, not the national political climate.
Groups that are not dominant at the local level, thus have to be involved in the decision-making process to advance such a process. This is not to suggest that powersharing arrangement should be instituted at the local level based on the example of state-level institutional arrangements.
Municipal governments should be required to include locally non-dominant groups on the basis of clearly set thresholds, matched by mediation committees, as have been instituted in Kosovo. Finally, some key decisions, such as budget or the urban plan can be subject to supermajorities, as has been practiced in Brčko since the establishment of the district in 1999. Adequate mechanisms at the local level can take of the pressure at the center of resolving conflicts in interethnic relations.
Furthermore, such mechanism can help alleviate the anxieties of local minorities, even if they are state or entity-wide majorities. As most minority rights instruments fail to adequately protect these groups and central power-sharing institution provide little articulation of their interests, these groups are often vulnerable and can be instrumentalized by nationalist political entrepreneurs.
Recommendations
§ Institute mechanisms to include non-dominant groups in the co-governance of local government on the basis of clear and transparent thresholds. § Introduce supermajorities for key local government decisions. § Establish mediation committees in communes with substantially mixed population.
Conclusions
Ethnopolitical identities, once mobilized, cannot be banned or abolished, they can only wither away. The above-mentioned suggestions are not intended to once and for all reduce the salience of ethnic identity in political life. Rather, they suggest a dynamic, process-oriented approach to institutional design in ethnically divided states.
Such a process can help transform the post-conflict region discussed here into political systems with less rigid levels of institutionalized ethnicity. Less ambitiously, they can also assist at fine-tuning and improving institutional arrangements that have failed to work self-sustainably over recent years. There can be little doubt that institutional arrangements cannot work without their larger social context. Institutions do not only shape political and social reality, they are also their product. The transition from the war to the post-war period has been all too smooth in large parts of the region with some of the same political elites holding office and little social dialogue over responsibility and causes of the war. As long as there is not a strong break with the past and processes of re-examining the wartime period are not initiated on a broad level, institutions cannot provide the stability sought after. 
